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Monitoring the Moneylenders: Institutional Accountability and Environmental 
Governance at the World Bank’s Inspection Panel  
 
Abstract: This article discusses how Independent Accountability Mechanisms (IAMs) such as 
an Inspection Panel have the potential to improve both the legitimacy and environmental 
governance of multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank.  The World Bank 
provides loans and credit to developing countries to stimulate social and economic development 
in an attempt to alleviate poverty, often investing in infrastructure projects such as pipelines, 
power plants, and oil and gas fields.  With billions in annual lending, the World Bank is the 
largest international financial institution in the world.  Between 1994, when it started operations, 
and June 2015, the World Bank Inspection Panel received 103 requests for inspection across 
more than 50 countries that resulted in 34 approved investigations.  Based on a qualitative case 
study methodology, the study finds that institutional accountability has inherent value in 
improving the internal governance of an institution—in this case the World Bank—and its ability 
to achieve development and sustainability goals.  Yet to be effective, collaborative governance 
needs steered by committed and independent leaders on all sides, and there are limits to what 
IAMs such as the IP can accomplish. Understanding the internal dynamics, processes, and 
accountability mechanisms of the World Bank offers a rare chance to test the efficacy of 
institutional accountability in practice. Moreover, this study shows how attributes reflecting 
independence, impartiality, transparency, professionalism, accessibility, and responsiveness are 
crucial to improving governance outcomes and more equitable decision-making processes—
themes highly relevant to public policy and development studies as well as environmental 
governance and the extractive industries.   
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1. Introduction 
 In the more than quarter-century since they were first proposed in the 1970s and 1980s, 
Independent Accountability Mechanisms (IAMs) have become a prominent fixture on the 
international stage.  IAMs have been hailed for enhancing the transparency and efficacy of 
intergovernmental and multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank or the European 
Investment Bank (Lewis 2012).  Indeed, as of 2012, more than a dozen IAMs were in operation 
globally and they had collectively handled a total of 260 complaints spanning 72 countries (CAO 
2012).  This may come as no surprise given that accountability and transparency mechanisms 
have long been held to promote improvements in governance, empowerment, responsibility, and 
democracy (Schillemans and Busuioc 2015; MacDonald and Miller-Dawkins 2015; Dobel 1992). 
Inspection Panels (IPs) are one of the more prevalent types of IAMs. IPs make it possible 
for citizens and communities to “challenge decisions of international bodies through a clear and 
independently administered accountability and recourse process” (World Bank  2009).   But do 
they work?  This study qualitatively examines the World Bank’s IP, the world’s first (Shihata 
2000) and also largest and longest running IP to date (World Bank Inspection Panel 2016).  This 
paper asks: what types of accountability does the IP promote?  What are some of the tangible 
benefits that result from the IP?  What challenges continue to hamper its effectiveness?  And, 
critically, what lessons does it offer scholars and practitioners of environmental governance and 
energy policy, core themes in this journal?    
Answer these questions yields multiple contributions.  First, and most obviously, the 
paper focuses on the performance of the World Bank Group (WBG), a major source of financing 
for energy and infrastructure projects (including pipelines, oil and gas fields, and power plants).  
International financial institutions such as the WBG are, in the words of Keohane (2002), 
“organized anarchies” founded and maintained to reduce transaction costs, offer information, and 
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enable agents to orchestrate complicated actions.  The WBG in particular is a multilateral 
institution that provides loans and credit to developing countries to stimulate social and 
economic development in an attempt to alleviate poverty (Clark 1999).  The WBG’s annual 
average lending ranges $60 to $70 billion in loans, grants, equity investments, and loan 
guarantees (World Bank 2015), making it the largest international development bank in the 
world.  Though it operates independently, the WBG’s major shareholders are France, Germany, 
Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom, and its major borrowers are Brazil, China, 
India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Russia.  Understanding the internal dynamics, processes, and 
accountability mechanisms of the WBG is therefore of importance for both scholars of 
environmental governance and energy policy and practitioners of multilateral financial aid. 
 Second, this study examines a particular type of accountability—institutional 
accountability—infrequently investigated in the environmental governance literature.   Much 
governance literature has broadly assessed personal accountability or professional accountability, 
usually meant to describe the relationships between a public servant or agency and an elected or 
appointed official (Bundt 2000; Hays et al. 2006; Romzek and Dubnick 1998). Others have 
analyzed the implementation of performance management and performance based contracting 
systems to see the extent to which they improve accountability or effectiveness (Moynihan et al. 
2001; Radin 2006).  Little research in environmental governance has yet explored institutional 
accountability—where an institution is held accountable by an independent, impartial, 
transparent, professional, accessible, and responsive panel—where options for due recourse, for 
redress, for increased participation and representation exist.  Institutional accountability is 
therefore meant to encompass not only accountability “for what” but also “to whom” (Bardach 
and Lesser 1996)—in this particular instance “for” harms such as the erosion of indigenous 
culture or the despoliation of the environment, and “to” an independent, external panel.  In this 
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way IPs seek to enhance performance through better independent monitoring, oversight, and 
control.  They attempt to “guard the guardians” and operate sort of like an internal affairs 
division of a police department (Cabral and Lazzarini 2015)—meaning they occupy a unique, 
and rarely studied, brand of accountability. 
 Third, the WBG’s IP is structured in a way that it is generally polycentric, participatory, 
and inclusive.  It coordinates multiple actors at multiple scales, making it a new mode of 
“polycentrism” (Ostrom 2010) or “collaborative governance” (Johnston et al. 2010) since it 
necessitates, to a degree, consensus-oriented, deliberative processes that stitch together 
government stakeholders, affected communities, private sector actors, management at the World 
Bank, and other institutions.  In other words, the IP reflects the principle of decentralized, 
citizen-driven accountability attempting to increase visibility and create more responsive systems 
of redress for people harmed by intergovernmental processes or projects (Lewis 2012).  
Examining the World Bank’s IP offers a rare chance to test the efficacy of this form of 
collaborative structure.   
2. Research Design, Case Selection, and Conceptual Focus  
To demonstrate the salience of accountability and IPs, the paper provides a historical, 
qualitative case study of the World Bank’s IP. The paper relies on a case study methodology 
because this is well suited for rich, qualitative and processual studies of phenomena in real-world 
contexts (Yin, 1994).   This particular method offers effective tools for specifically analyzing the 
contextual dynamics of institutions and controversy (Mjøset, 2009).  The World Bank’s IP was 
chosen because it was the first and therefore has the most operational experience. In addition, the 
WBG offers a unique place to test the efficacy of institutional accountability because its 
membership includes almost every country in the world (Woods 2000).  Moreover, as Bugalski 
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(2016: 3) writes, the WBG’s template for an IP has come to be modelled by many other 
international actors:  
The Bank’s accountability system, encompassing its safeguard policies and the Inspection 
Panel, has been emulated in some form and to varying extents by all other traditional 
multilateral development finance institutions and some bilateral aid agencies. The system 
has also spread, somewhat tentatively, into the world of private finance. 
The author conducted primary research at the archives of both the World Bank and the World 
Bank’s IP (which has a separate secretariat, website, and institutional repository).  Both archives 
are open to the public.  The paper also synthesizes, inductively, historical data from textual 
academic sources when relevant, most of them from the legal studies and jurisprudence 
literature.  Admittedly, this review of the literature was not completely systematic and was done 
more to supplement or triangulate the archival results.   
To provide a bit more justification and background for case study selection, the WBG is 
actually comprised of five separate organizations.  The International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) was created in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference, as a special 
agency of the United Nations.  Its purpose was to allocate money from wealthy nations to those 
that needed help financing reconstruction efforts after World War II.  According to the IBRD 
website, its role has now shifted: 
The IBRD works with its members to achieve equitable and sustainable economic 
growth in their national economies and to find solutions to pressing regional and 
global problems in economic development and in other important areas, such as 
environmental sustainability. It pursues its overriding goal—to overcome poverty 
and improve standards of living—primarily by providing loans, risk management 
products, and expertise on development-related disciplines and by coordinating 
responses to regional and global challenges.1 
                                                 
1 See http://www.worldbank.org/ibrd.  
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The IBRD remains the Bank’s second largest lender with $18.6 billion invested in 93 operations 
in fiscal year 2015 involving 188 member countries, offering money and guarantees to middle 
income governments for development projects.   
The next largest part of the Bank is the International Development Association, or IDA, 
established in 1960 to fund projects in developing countries unable to borrow money on IBRD’s 
terms.  Bankers sometimes call these loans “soft” since they have extended grace periods and 
minimal finance charges.  As the WBG (2012) described it, the IDA “supports countries’ efforts 
to boost economic growth, reduce poverty, and improve the living conditions of the poor.”  In 
2015, 81 countries received IDA assistance worth roughly $22.3 billion in total, the largest of 
any part of the WBG. 
The third branch of the WBG is the International Finance Corporation (IFC), created in 
1956 and owned by 176 member countries.  In 2015, it invested $17.2 billion across 100 
countries.  Unlike the previous two branches, the IFC lends to the private sector rather than 
governments, and its mandate is to “promote productive and profitable private enterprises in 
developing nations” and to allow “financial institutions in emerging markets to create jobs, 
generate tax revenues, improve corporate governance and environmental performance, and 
contribute to their local communities” (World Bank 2012).  The IFC generally offers technical 
assistance to companies including privatizing government linked monopolies, protecting 
securities, and creating stock exchanges.   
The fourth and fifth arms of the WBG are the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA), created in 1988 with about $3.1 billion of investments and guarantees in 2014, and the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), created in 1966 to resolve 
disputes between foreign investors and governments. 
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Due to its size and scale, the WBG is a major financier of infrastructure and mining 
projects around the world. Although precise numbers differ year-to-year, as Figure 1 shows 
lending for energy/mining and transport are among its largest sectors, although the WBG is also 
involved in supporting agriculture, health care, education, and trade.   
Figure 1: World Bank Lending by Theme and Sector for the IBRD and IDA, 2007 to 2014 
(millions of dollars) 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using World Bank data.  
 A core concept utilized throughout the paper to assess the efficacy or impact of the WBG 
is that of “accountability.” Most generally, accountability can be defined as the process by which 
“actors record and disclose their behavior, in the broadest sense of the word, to an external 
audience (forum or principal)” (Schillemans and Busuioc 2015).  Some scholars have classified 
variants of accountability with different origins of authority, including bureaucratic 
accountability (how officials and organizations shape expectations about what is acceptable 
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within an institution), legal accountability (control through laws and regulations), professional 
accountability (control through professionalism and norms), and political accountability (control 
through elections and participatory democracy) (Brandsma and Schillemans 2012; Henrich et al. 
2009) 
 This paper in particular focuses on institutional accountability, a type of accountability 
operationalized through having a clear, independent administrative entity that can handle 
grievances.  More specifically, institutional accountability revolves around the theoretical 
principles of independence, impartiality, transparency, integrity and professionalism, 
accessibility, and responsiveness (Lewis 2012).  Independence means that an IP must operate 
separately from the institution it is supposed to govern—it cannot be influenced or constrained 
by reporting requirements, restrictions on budget, or interference with its aims and scope.  As 
Lewis (2012) suggests, IPs must be impartial, entering into disputes and complaints without a 
predisposition toward any given position and without conflict of interest.  Lewis (2012) also 
argues that the IP process must be transparent—with full public disclosure of information as well 
as the features of the decision-making process.  Integrity and professionalism mean that IP 
principals and their supporting staff are credible, competent, and qualified to undertake their 
duties (Lewis 2012). Lewis (2012) lastly suggests that IPs must be accessible, meaning people 
are aware of its existence, and few barriers to entry or prevent people from engaging with it; and 
that IPs must also be responsive, meaning that they pursue their efforts in a timely manner and 
also are duly diligent at reaching a decision and implementing recommendations.   
 The next three sections present the qualitative data gleaned from the archival research 
and literature review.  It attempts to structure this data inductively and coherently into a 
narrative, since narratives and storylines are an elemental part of understanding human (and 
institutional) behavior (Czarniawska 2004). When laying out its analysis, the paper cycles back 
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and forth from our data collected and narrative to provide opportunity for the material to fit itself 
around the research questions in an iterative process (Strauss 1990).  Those questions are: how 
does the IP function?  What type of accountability does it promote?  And, what challenges exist 
to its operation?  The sections to come answer these questions in order. 
3. The Dynamics of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel 
How does the WBG’s IP work?  In colloquial terms, the Inspection Panel (hereafter “IP”) 
was created to ensure that the WBG meets its own social and environmental safeguards and, 
responds to complaints from communities affected by sponsored projects.  The germination for 
the IP in particular began in the 1980s when nongovernmental organizations began criticizing the 
WBG for violating its own policies concerning involuntary resettlement (established in 1982), 
tribal peoples (created in 1982), and environmental impact assessment (formed in 1988) 
(Bignami 2016).  The Sardar Sarovar Dam and Canal projects on the Narmada River in India 
served as a flashpoint for these concerns, as they involved the forced relocation and resettlement 
of more than 120,000 people and induced significant environmental damages.  Initial project 
plans involved, among other things, the construction of 30 large dams, 135 medium-scale dams, 
and 3,000 smaller dams on the Narmada River.  The largest of these, the Sardar Sarovar Dam, 
submerged 37,000 hectares of land and required the evacuation and resettlement of 245 villages, 
almost all of them home to indigenous peoples, across the states of Gujarat, Maharashtra, and 
Madhya Pradesh.  The Canal network, similarly, necessitated the clearing of 80,000 hectares of 
land for construction (Clark 2003).  The WBG approved funding for these projects throughout 
the 1980s but continued to make disbursements even after civil society groups raised social and 
environmental concerns.  By the early 1990s, the WBG was “under attack” for violating its 
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safeguards for these projects (World Bank 2003), making it what one study called “a lightning 
rod for transnational protest” (Fox 2003). 
As a response to the ensuing outcry, then WBG President Barber Conable created an 
independent commission to review the Indian projects in 1991 to be headed by Branford Morse, 
a retired senior administrator from the United Nations Development Program, and Thomas 
Berger, a former Supreme Court Justice from British Columbia, Canada.  The commission 
released a report, informally known as the “Morse Commission Report,” in 1992 and identified 
“serious compliance failures” by the WBG as well as “devastating human and environmental 
consequences of those violations” (World Bank 2009).  Follow-up investigations across the 
WBG’s entire portfolio implied that managers habitually failed to carry out the organization’s 
goals of poverty alleviation and environmental protection (Werlin 2003).  Even the WBG’s own 
1992 internal review of its lending practices, known as the Wapenhans Report, concluded that 
the WBG was “suffering from a performance crisis” with almost 40 percent of projects scoring 
“unsatisfactory” ratings, widespread defaults on loans, and an overall “culture of approval” that 
prioritized making loans at the expense of local communities and preserving ecosystems (Clark 
2003).  Part of the explanation was that managers were rewarded for moving as many projects as 
possible forward but were not penalized if those projects suffered from poor design or 
shortcomings in accommodating local peoples.  The implication was that the WBG’s violations 
of its procedures symbolized a systematic failure on the part of bank management (World Bank 
2009).  
 To address these concerns, the Executive Board established the IP in September 1993 as 
an “Independent Accountability Mechanism” to commence operations on August 1, 1994.  The 
stated goal of the IP was to provide a forum “for people who believe that they may be adversely 
affected by Bank-financed operations to bring their concerns to the highest decision-making 
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levels of the World Bank” (World Bank 2009).  The role of the IP was to operate “as an 
independent forum to provide accountability and recourse for communities affected by Bank-
financed projects, to address harms resulting from policy noncompliance, and to help improve 
development effectiveness of the Bank’s operations” (World Bank Inspection Panel 2011).  In 
the words of James D. Wolfensohn, a former President of the WBG: 
When the Board of Directors of the World Bank created the [IP, it was] an 
unprecedented means for increasing the transparency and accountability of the Bank's 
operations. This was a first of its kind for an international organization—the creation of 
an independent mechanism to respond to claims by those whom we are most intent on 
helping that they have been adversely affected by the projects we finance. By giving 
private citizens—and especially the poor—a new means of access to the Bank, it has 
empowered and given voice to those we most need to hear. At the same time, it has served 
the Bank itself through ensuring that we really are fulfilling our mandate of improving 
conditions for the world's poorest people. The Inspection Panel tells us whether we are 
following our own policies and procedures, which are intended to protect the interests of 
those affected by our projects as well as the environment. 
 
The IP was to decide whether the Bank complied with its own policies and procedures, 
especially its social and environmental impact assessments, and ensure that its projects avoid 
harm to people and the natural environment. 
To accomplish these tasks, the IP operates according to four key practices: independent 
fact-finding, problem-solving, checks and balances, and transparency and participation. To 
respond to complaints from communities affected by WBG projects, the Panel conducts 
independent investigations and compiles facts to establish whether the WBG followed 
operational policies and procedures.  It plays a role in helping affected communities document 
problems with projects and then considers solutions to them.  The IP provides a check and 
balance on the WBG Board and the actions of Bank managers.  It lastly promotes transparency in 
Bank operations through the publication of reports and findings. 
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To assuage its member countries and borrowing governments, the WBG created its IP to 
consist of three separate “circles.” The first, and central circle, are the three individual Members 
of the IP, each from a different country, chosen for a period of five years that cannot be renewed.  
Members are selected and appointed for their “ability to deal thoroughly and fairly with the 
requests brought to them, their integrity and their independence from Bank Management” 
(World Bank 2009). The second circle consists of an Executive Secretariat and a small number 
of support staff created to help advise and assist the Members in executing their duties.  The third 
circle consists of internationally recognized experts who assist the IP with specific 
investigations, providing Members with reliable information in fields as diverse as anthropology, 
forestry, and hydrology.  
The IP itself was given three explicit investigatory, advisory, and rulemaking powers.  
The IP has the authority to investigate complaints about the failure of WBG projects as they 
relate to its operational policies and procedures in the design, appraisal, implementation, or 
evaluation of a project.  It has the authority to advise the Executive Directors of the WBG about 
which complaints to pursue.  It has the authority to determine which rules apply to a particular 
case and to resolve any issues that may arise as complaints go forward.   
In carrying out these tasks, each complaint brought before the IP passes through four 
phases: eligibility, investigation, report writing, and board discussion.  Any two or more 
individuals affected by any WBG project can bring a complaint before the panel by writing a 
short letter, formally called a “Request for Inspection.”  These requests need not be long—some 
are only one page—they can be in any language, they can be hand written, they can be 
extensively or sparsely detailed, and they can be submitted confidentially.  Once a Request for 
Inspection is submitted, the Panel must determine whether it meets the following criteria for 
eligibility, last updated in 2011: 
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 The affected party must consist of any two or more persons with common interests or 
concerns and who are in the borrower’s territory; 
 The request must assert in substance that a serious violation by the Bank of its 
operational policies and procedures has or is likely to have a material adverse effect on 
the requester;  
 The request must assert that its subject matter has been brought to Management’s 
attention and that, in the requester’s view, Management has failed to respond adequately 
demonstrating that it has followed or is taking steps to follow the Bank’s policies and 
procedures; 
 The matter cannot be related to procurement; 
 The related loan must not be closed or substantially disbursed; 
 The Panel must not have previously made a finding on the subject matter or, if it has, the 
request must state that there is new evidence or circumstances not known at the time of 
the prior request. 
Complaints meeting these criteria generally enter a field investigation phase where the IP retains 
outside experts and collects facts relating to the case, including visits to the project and meetings 
with the Requesters—the author says “generally” because in rare circumstances the Executive 
Board has failed to approve IP recommended investigations. All data collected during the 
investigation is synthesized into a report submitted to the Bank’s Board, made available to the 
public upon their approval.  The final phase consists of the Board asking relevant project 
managers to provide recommendations in response to the Panel’s report and, when necessary, 
creating an “Action Plan” to remedy harm and bring the project into compliance.  Figure 2 
graphically depicts the IP process during the first two phases.   
Figure 2: The Eligibility and Investigation Phases of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel 
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Source: World Bank Inspection Panel. * The pilot allows Requesters to seek opportunities for 
early solutions for complaints when certain criteria are met. 
 
Between 1994, when it started operations, and June 2015, its most recent evaluation, the 
IP had received 103 requests for inspection from more than 50 countries that resulted in 34 
approved investigations.  These have dealt with IBRD and IDA loans as well as the Global 
Environment Facility and Trust Funds, with Figure 3 showing the most common complaints 
involving supervision and environmental impact assessments (World Bank Inspection Panel 
2011, 2014, 2015), although land, resettlement, and infrastructure issues were also frequently 
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investigated.  Geographically, while countries located in Sub-Saharan Africa or Latin America 
and the Caribbean represented almost two-thirds (61%) of received requests, South Asia and 
Europe and Central Asia were also subject to frequent investigations.       
Figure 3: Profile of Inspection Panel Requests by Institution, Policy-Related Issues, and 
Received Requests (as of June, 2015) 
a. Top panel: Requests received  
 
b. Middle panel: Issues most often raised in requests  
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c. Bottom panel: Requests received by region and type of requestor  
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Source: World Bank Inspection Panel 2015.  
4. Examining the Benefits of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel  
What types of accountability does the IP promote—and what benefits have accrued so 
far?  To date, drawing inferentially from the case study data, this section of the study argues that 
four of the IP’s benefits are discussed most frequently: it has (1) improved the governance of 
WBG operations, (2) resulted in the cancelation of harmful WBG projects, (3) empowered 
communities with the knowledge they need to seek meaningful redress and compensation, and 
(4) enhanced the protection of human rights by starting a hopeful trend in international law and 
public administration.  
4.1 Improved Efficacy of World Bank Operations 
In theory, the IP has great potential to improve internal WBG governance by spotlighting 
missing information, uncovering flaws in assessments, acknowledging noncompliance, and 
enlightening management.  As previously mentioned, it does this by expanding check-and-
balance mechanisms so that concerns can be brought directly before the Executive Board of the 
Bank, and by creating a public record of how well the institution is complying with its own 
safeguards.  Bradlow (1993-1994) states that the IP generates authoritative, high quality, timely, 
objective information about projects that can be used by Bank managers wishing to mitigate 
problems, as well as by member countries concerned about the legitimacy of the Bank and by 
governments considering whether they want WBG assistance.  The public record created by IP 
investigations and findings can also enable members of civil society to better assist marginalized 
groups and learn about Bank practices and procedures (Bradlow 1993-1994).  
In practice, examples abound confirming that the IP has improved the performance of 
some WBG managers and the efficiency of some programs in meeting their intended goals.  In 
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their investigation of the West Africa Gas Pipeline Project, for example, the IP documented that 
the WBG did not meet its own requirements of livelihood restoration and resettlement, and that 
there had been an embarrassing factor of ten mistake in undercompensating indigenous peoples 
for the value of their land.  It also found that project documents overestimated the amount of 
natural gas flaring the project could reduce—mistakes that were promptly corrected (World Bank 
2009).  In their investigation of the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline, the IP spotlighted how the 
project did not incorporate a proper regional health plan into its assessments, failed to develop 
sound water and sanitation facilities around the project area, and lacked an appropriate weighing 
of how oil and gas projects impacted local communities—mistakes that were also corrected 
(Utzinger et al. 2005).   
In other cases, complaints led to the sanctioning or firing of WBG staff.  In their 
investigation of the Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project in Kenya, the IP 
discovered that project managers had failed to meet the public consultation components of the 
bank’s environmental impact assessment policy (Clark 2003).  In their investigation of the 
Albania Integrated Coastal Zone Management and Clean-Up Project, the IP discovered that 
managers had intentionally misrepresented facts concerning the demolition of homes in project 
appraisal documents and board meetings, findings that convinced the Board to “clean house” and 
terminate the employment of some senior managers (World Bank 2009).   
4.2 Suspension and Cancellation of Harmful Projects 
Although rare, IP investigations have successfully suspended and cancelled socially and 
environmentally harmful WBG projects.  Strikingly, the best example here is the first 
investigation ever conducted of the proposed Arun III Hydroelectric Project in Nepal in 1994.  
The IP’s investigation of the $800 million project revealed that the Bank had failed to observe 
World Bank Inspection Panel 19 
proper requirements for relocation and resettlement, and that the project had tenuous economic 
justification given the fragile state of Nepal’s economy.  After receiving the IP’s report, Bank 
President James Wolfensohn completely terminated the Bank’s support (World Bank 2009).  
Analogously, after the IP revealed that the Bank had “extensively violated” its policies 
concerning project design and the participation of vulnerable ethnic groups in consultations 
related to the China Western Poverty Reduction Project in Qinghai, the Board cancelled the 
Bank’s involvement.  More than a decade later, in 2005, the IP’s report had a similar effect on 
the Mumbai Urban Transport Project in India, a scheme involving the relocation of more than 
120,000 people.  Their report documented “significant compliance failures in resettlement 
activities” ultimately convincing the Bank to suspend disbursements until employment options 
were expanded for local shopkeepers, and until databases for redressing grievances were 
improved (World Bank 2009).  More recently, in 2015 an IP report revealed that the WBG failed 
to make sure that families displaced by a $75 million high-voltage power transmission line 
project in Nepal were properly counted and compensated, given that they relied on outdated 
census data.  Consequently, the Khimti-Dhalkebar Transmission Line was suspended (Chavkin 
2015).  That same year, the mere threat of an IP investigation into a World Bank project in 
Uzbekistan concerning child and forced labor in the cotton industry convinced the government to 
comply with third-party monitoring from the International Labor Organization international to 
ensure global human rights standards were met (Taylor 2015). 
The severity of cancelling or suspending projects is credited with creating a prophylactic 
effect on bank management.  The threat of an IP investigation has contributed to “allergic 
reactions” among bank staff to risky or controversial projects, offering an antidote to the “culture 
of approval” so widespread throughout the Bank in the 1980s and 1990s.   One senior managing 
director of the WBG has stated that due to the IP, “risk aversion is widespread, among front line 
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managers especially … It comes out in the choice of projects. It looks like staff are avoiding 
certain types of projects” (quoted in Treakle et al. 2003).  Bradlow (1993-1994) found that “the 
possibility that Bank staff could be held personally accountable for the manner in which they 
make and implement decisions” has encouraged them to be “more responsive to and respectful of 
those who are affected by their decisions,” essentially deterring bad behavior.  The IFC and 
MIGA have adopted environmental and social policies and created the Compliance Advisor and 
Ombudsman Office in 1998 and 1999, respectively, to proactively ensure that their projects 
better meet WBG guidelines. 
4.3 Broader community empowerment 
The IP has empowered communities by giving affected persons stronger voices, 
respecting their account of events, and redressing implementation problems. As Clark (1999) 
explains: 
The indirect effects of the Panel process can be very valuable for local citizens 
affected by Bank projects, as several past cases have demonstrated. First, the 
Panel process provides a forum where they can raise concerns that have in many 
cases been ignored for years. Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the Panel 
process, this raises awareness of the problems at the highest levels in the Bank 
and in the borrowing country. It can also be empowering for the claimants.  
Another indirect effect is increased media attention and support from 
international NGOs interested in Bank activities. International attention has so 
far played a critical role in pressuring the Board to take action. In addition, the 
time and effort involved in launching an Inspection Panel claim has increased 
solidarity among the claimants, empowered them to have a dialogue with 
government officials and project authorities, increased awareness within the 
country, and strengthened the networks of support at the local, national and 
international levels. 
 
Indeed, one assessment evaluated 28 claims submitted to the IP between 1994 and 2002 and 
found that in 10 of those cases—Arun, Planafloro, Jamuna, Yacyretá, Jute Sector, Itaparica, 
Singrauli, Land Reform, China/Tibet, and Structural Adjustment Argentina—had positive 
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impacts on local communities.  It concluded that “the Inspection Panel has given increased 
legitimacy to the claims of local people affected by the World Bank, and it serves as a forum 
through which their voices have been amplified within the institution” (Treakle et al. 2003). 
In Africa, the IP’s investigation of the Democratic Republic of Congo Forest-Related 
Operations project raised media attention to the plight of the Pygmy peoples and led to 
recognition of the non-economic value they placed on Congolese forests.  That recognition 
convinced the federal government to place nationwide restrictions on logging (World Bank 
2009).  In India, IP investigations of coal mining in Singrauli resulted in increased compensation 
for affected people; in the case of the $1.7 billion 3,100 MW Yacyretá Dam, IP findings resulted 
in changes in design for smaller reservoirs that preserved the hunting and fishing grounds of 
some local communities (Udall 2000).  In Bangladesh, the IP-prompted controversy over the 
Jamuna Bridge precipitated in the national government recognizing, for the first time, the right of 
the Char people to compensation (Fox and Treakle 2003).  The mere act of filing a complaint in 
the Romania Mine Closure and Social Mitigation Project was enough to motivate the 
government to cancel it, without the IP needing to conduct an investigation (World Bank 2009).  
IP actions have also resulted in legal protections for the Yorongar people in Chad, the virtual 
elimination of prostitution along the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline, and greater protections against 
deforestation in Cambodia (Kim 2008-2009). 
4.4 Enhanced protection of human rights 
The IP has motivated other agencies and institutions to create their own accountability 
mechanisms and enhanced the global protection of human rights.  Bradlow (1993-1994) opines 
that “the creation of the Panel is an important legal development” since it is “the first forum in 
which private actors can hold an international organization directly accountable for the 
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consequences of its failure.”  This prompted the Inter-American Development Bank to create its 
own inspection panel in 1994 and the Asian Development Bank to create its own inspection 
mechanisms in 1995.  The European Union established the International Right to Know Day on 
September 28, 2000, and created its own accountability mechanisms similar to the IP known as 
the European Ombudsman Office (EOO). Each year, the EOO receives a sobering 2,500 to 3,000 
complaints addressed to institutions of the EU, of which 600 or so are investigated (Guarascio 
2012).  Similarly, the European Investment Bank (2012) established its “Complaints 
Mechanisms Principles” in 2010 to hold that Bank more accountable to its stakeholders; the 
EIB’s mechanism investigates roughly 40 cases every year. 
As such, Boisson de Chazournes argues that “the measures taken by the Bank to 
strengthen information disclosure have contributed to the promotion of transparency and access 
to information,” and that as a result, “the Inspection Panel is a progressive step in the 
development of both the law of international organizations and the law of human rights.”  
Confirming these points, an independent evaluation from the Center for International 
Environmental Law, Bank Information Center, and the International Accountability Project 
acknowledged that the IP process was useful for protecting human rights and that it the Panel’s 
cases “opened the door” for groups to incorporate human rights concerns into their complaints 
(Herz and Perrault 2009). 
5. Revealing the Limits to the World Bank’s Inspection Panel 
 What limitations and barriers must the IP confront?  Though the World Bank’s IP has 
culminated in some meaningful benefits, this section of the paper argues, inductively from the 
case study material, that it also faces challenges related to (1) transaction costs, (2) a limited 
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mandate, (3) lack of independence and resistance from the WBG, (4) retaliation against 
complainants, and (5) the overall momentum of Bank culture.  
5.1 Transaction costs with bringing a complaint 
 Though the criteria for filing a complaint with the IP are relatively simple, and 
complaints can theoretically be only one page long, in practice filing a successful complaint is a 
technical process that requires the assistance of experts including lawyers and development 
specialists.  As one study noted, this process “requires a fair amount of technical knowledge and 
work on the part of the claimants … the requirements have made access to the panel difficult for 
those very people it was established to serve” (Treakle et al. 2003).   
For instance, the only formal point of contact after complainants have contacted the IP is 
to meet with the panel if it decides to conduct a field investigation, though if that does happen, 
the Panel nearly always visits the country to meet with the requesters, verify signatures, and get 
their input before writing its report as to whether to recommend an investigation.  The requesters 
can also provide information to the Panel throughout the complaint process, yet there is no 
opportunity for complainants to comment on how the Executive Board or bank managers 
respond, nor are claimants given access to information before decisions are made about their 
claim, nor do they have a right to comment on whatever remedial measures are to be taken.  
There is also no right for claimants to appeal panel findings or the Board’s decision about how to 
proceed with claims and Action Plans. 
 Consequently, claimants can go through the arduous process of documenting and filing a 
complaint, only to have nothing done, even if they have demonstrated harm.  For instance, in a 
claim concerning the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, a scheme involving at the time the 
construction of Africa’s largest dam, the project substantially increased water prices for local 
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people and disproportionately impacted poor townships—but the IP decided not to pursue an 
investigation since “the claimants had not made a link between the conditions they complained 
of and specific bank policy violations” (Treakle et al. 2003).  Similarly, in a complaint filed 
concerning the $167 million Rondonia Agricultural, Livestock, and Forestry (Planafloro) 
project, a collection of 25 organizations representing indigenous peoples, small farmers, unions, 
and environmental groups exhaustively documented how the scheme compromised the integrity 
of local rainforests.  The IP found that the Bank “failed to implement the project as planned” and 
had in their poor oversight facilitated illegal logging which was destroying up to 400,000 
hectares of rainforest each year.  The Executive Board, however, denied an investigation 
(Dunkerton 1995).  (In the IP’s defense, this particular case came before the 1999 revisions 
which changed the Board approval procedure for an investigation to approval on a non-objection 
basis, rather than requiring affirmative Board approval). 
5.2 Limited mandate  
 Though the IP can bring attention to problematic projects and has authority to make 
findings to the Bank’s Executive Board, it remains constrained by a limited mandate.  Most 
significantly, the IP does not have the ability to provide any relief to complainants, even 
successful ones.  The IP panel cannot make recommendations in a legal or binding sense, either, 
it can only make “findings” which may or may include substantive and important observations.  
The IP cannot directly offer compensation, it cannot by itself issue an injunction against further 
work on a project, it does not oversee the generation of Action Plans, and it cannot rule that a 
project should be cancelled, or provide redress.  It cannot even prevent governments or other 
institutions from retaliating against complainants, something discussed in greater detail below.  
The IP merely advises the Executive Board, which then determines how to proceed.  And then 
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we have a veritable list of other weaknesses: it cannot focus on non-project loans, it cannot select 
its own members, it can only investigate the bank rather than the borrower, and so on (Fourie 
2012; Zalcberg 2012; Fauchald 2013).  As Udall (2000) explained decades ago, “the Panel is—
by the nature of its powers—a limited creature. It is not an enforcement or judicial mechanism.” 
 This inability to provide relief has proven to be a substantial barrier.  In the case of the 
3,100 MW Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project in Argentina and Paraguay, although the IP found that 
the Bank “had violated numerous policies and procedures,” bank management never fully 
followed through to ensure the complete implementation of Action Plans, though management 
did report back to the Board on at least two occasions (Carrascott and Guernsey 2008).  In the 
case of the Cartagena Water Supply, Sewerage, and Environmental Management Project in 
Colombia, the IP found “numerous problems” with how the project would discharge waste into 
the Caribbean Sea.  Yet it took Bank management three years to implement an action plan—by 
which point most of the damage to coastal villages had already been done (Carrascott and 
Guernsey 2008).  And in the case of the Mumbai Urban Transport Project, Bank management 
failed to meet their deadline for submitting an action plan and delayed for more than a year, 
meaning almost none of the targets recommended by the Executive Board were met (Carrascott 
and Guernsey 2008). 
Moreover, the IP is constrained by the criterion that that it cannot investigate projects 
where “the loan financing the project has been substantially disbursed.”  This is problematic for 
two reasons.  First, many problems with Bank projects do not manifest themselves until years 
after disbursement.  Second, bank managers who know or suspect a complaint is coming can 
strategically disburse large amounts of it in order to make it “non-redressable,” manipulating the 
process to their advantage.  Even when IP investigations do accomplish empowerment and media 
attention, their impact can be short lived.  As Hunter (2003) noted, “The short-term benefits that 
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come from the added attention brought by filing a Panel claim do not necessarily translate into 
long-term sustainable benefits.  Too often, the Panel's recommendations and the subsequent 
Board decision provide momentum for change-momentum that is lost once the Panel's and civil 
society's attention turns.” 
These limitations have certainly blunted the efficacy of the IP, especially concerning 
serious matters such as displacement and involuntary resettlement (World Bank Inspection Panel 
2016).   A recent internal review of the Panel’s database suggests that of the 32 cases 
investigated between 1994 and 2016, 21 (two-thirds) involved involuntary resettlement.  
However, in half of those cases, such resettlement was not mentioned as a risk within project 
assessment documents, and the report concluded that “the Bank’s ultimate policy goal of 
conceiving and executing resettlements as sustainable development programs has not been 
achieved in many of the cases investigated by the Panel.” 
5.3 Lack of independence and internal resistance  
The independence of the IP, and its acceptance within both the Executive Board and the 
Bank as a whole, has ebbed and flowed.  At least two distinct phases are discernible: a period of 
fierce resistance after the IP’s first case involving the Arun Dam in Nepal, and a period of almost 
universal support. 
The first six years of the IP were tumultuous, and witnessed intense and protracted 
resistance to the IP within the Executive Board.  Between the Arun Dam investigation in 1994 
and 1995, and the China Western Poverty Reduction Project in 1999 and 2000, five years lapsed 
and extensive reforms were made before the Executive Board would yet again authorize the IP to 
conduct full investigations.  During those five years, in every case where the IP recommended an 
investigation, the Board, upon advice from a combination of senior managers, borrowing country 
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governments, and some donors, either rejected the IP’s authority to investigate (in cases such as 
Planafloro, Itaparica, and EcoDevelopment) or limited the terms of reference for the 
investigation (in Yacyretá and Singrauli).  During this phase, Clark (2003) notes that: 
Bank management resented the panel’s scrutiny and strongly resisted being held 
accountable. Management responses to the Inspection Panel claims tended to 
deny policy violations and deny responsibility for problems identified in the claim 
(usually blaming the borrowing government for the problems instead). 
Management responses also tended to challenge the eligibility of claimants and 
propose “action plans” as alternatives to panel investigations. 
 
Throughout this rough period of adjustment, Dunkerton criticized the IP as nothing more than a 
“public relations tool for the Bank and a political liability for borrowing nations” (Dunkerton 
1995). Admittedly, the Executive Board of the Bank was in a precarious position: they had to 
balance their attempts at impartiality and support for the nascent IP with the wishes of managers 
and donors with whom it had to work. 
Things started to change 1998 when the IP entered a second phase of seemingly earnest 
acceptance.  Most Board members were “frustrated that a mechanism that had been designed to 
help reduce their problems in dealing with difficult projects was instead generating more conflict 
at the Board” (Clark 2003).  Consequently, in March of 1998 the Board began a formal review of 
the panel process, establishing a working group consisting of three borrowing country executive 
directors and three donor country executive directors.  The review’s conclusions, released in 
April of 1999, called on the Board to make a number of reforms, which they did.  The Board 
released an internal memorandum to all staff affirming the “importance,” “independence,” and 
“integrity” of the IP.  It instructed project managers and staff to base their recommendations on 
the findings of the panel, rather than to try and preempt panel investigations.  It, most 
meaningfully, reached a compromise concerning the issue of the Board rejecting IP findings for 
investigation by clarifying that “if the Panel so recommends, the Board will authorize an 
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investigation without making a judgment on the merits of the claimants’ request, and without 
discussion,” except with respect to technical criteria for eligibility.  The Panel’s recommendation 
on whether to conduct an investigation was also sent to the Executive Board on a non-objection 
basis.  In exchange, the IP’s assessment period was reduced to simplify the evaluation process.   
Testing these changes, the complaint over the China Western Poverty Reduction Project 
showcased the Board fully respecting the IP’s recommendation for a full investigation, and for 
the next decade or so, the board “universally authorized” the panel to investigate when it so 
recommended (Clark 2003). During the 2010 to 2014 fiscal years, even though more than a 
dozen of the IP’s reports on eligibility required full discussion by the Board instead of their usual 
approval on a “non-objection” basis, the Board has respected the IP’s autonomy. 
Most recently, the IP has shifted again to controversial times.  Bugalski (2016) argues 
that over the past few years, the WBG has undertaken a far more “discretionary” and “cautious” 
approach towards managing social and environmental impacts, with more emphasis placed on 
moving projects forward even when somewhat significant concerns are raised.  This is because 
the WBG is now forced to compete with other multilateral donors and development banks (many 
which have more relaxed standards) and must fight to remain competitive.  Bugalski (2016) 
warns that “as the Bank strives to recast itself as an attractive lender to governments and public-
private partnerships, there are emerging signs that it will sacrifice its system of accountability to 
project-affected people that it has built - albeit on wobbly foundations, and imperfectly - over the 
past three decades.”  This new logic behind WBG operations suggests that social safeguards 
should help guide, but should not prescribe or limit the design and implement of projects.  Other 
commentators have noted similar difficulties and tensions between accountability and efficacy 
approving projects with new “pilots” being launched under the IP (Fields and Mohr 2016; Tyson 
2015).  
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5.4 Retaliation against complainants  
Perhaps the most serious challenge faced by the IP is retaliation against those that file 
complaints, in some cases involving imprisonment and even death.  In the case of the Mumbai 
Urban Transport Project, one of the lead requesters was imprisoned shortly after the IP sent its 
report to the board (though he was released a few months later).  In the case of the Chad 
Cameroon pipeline, security forces from the government repeatedly threatened requestors in an 
attempt to persuade them to drop the complaint (World Bank 2009).   
In the case of the coal mines in the Singrauli region of central India, retaliation was more 
severe.  The WBG had loaned $150 million to the National Thermal Power Corporation (NPTC) 
in India to enable it to build the Singrauli Super Thermal Power Plant, but environmental and 
social assessments found that 90 percent of those having to be relocated had already been 
displaced once.  An independent report warned that that resettlement “appears to have failed in 
practically all cases” and highlighted “the inadequacy of facilities and equipment necessary for 
water supply, sewage treatment, schools and education, and medical care” (NTPC 1991).  In 
1993, still more loans came into India, with $400 million in financing for the expansion and 
upgrading of the Rihand and Vindhyachal coal-fired power plants, making the NPTC the single 
largest borrower in the history of the WBG at that time.  Facing threats of abuse and eviction, a 
group of families banded together and filed a complaint to the IP in 1997.  The act of filing the 
claim, however, prompted a “retaliatory backlash from NTPC, which moved into the project area 
with police force and heavy machinery,” and “in the area around the Vindhyachal power plant, 
people were beaten and physically restrained while their homes were bulldozed in the presence 
of and at the behest of NTPC” (Clark 2003b).  In sum, accessing the IP in this instance led 
literally to the eradication of an entire set of communities and villages.  
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5.5 The momentum of bank culture 
Though the IP has improved the aspects of efficiency, efficacy, and accountability of 
WBG operations to some extent, it has not addressed some of the deeper underlying problems at 
the institution.  Countervailing institutional pressures, such as incentives that reward staff for 
lending large amounts of money and meeting annual lending targets, remain.  There is evidence 
that most managers remain focused on “dollars lent” rather than “poverty reduced,” and staff are 
still incentivized to move projects through the approval process faster both to raise revenue and 
to avoid offending borrowing governments (Werlin 2003).   
There is also evidence that the WBG is a culturally and intellectually homogenous 
organization that may be incapable of understanding, let alone protecting, indigenous people of 
different cultures.  For instance, eight out of every ten employees at the WBG are trained in 
economics and finance institutions in the United States and United Kingdom, rather than in 
sociology or anthropology, or at leading institutions in the developing world. As Woods (2000) 
critiqued, “this homogeneity in staffing poses some difficulties for institutions trying to open 
themselves up to higher levels of participation, involvement and ownership by those most 
affected by their programs.” 
Goldman (2004, 2005) has gone so far as to attack the WBG’s “imperialist” approach to 
development, arguing that for every $1 invested by the WBG in developing countries, 
somewhere between $10 and $13 go back to its Members.  A greater amount of capital therefore 
flows out of borrowing countries rather than in.  And since the WBG always has more capital 
than it can lend, to survive Goldman argues that it must continually grow its investment portfolio 
and create demand for its services.  Put in this light, the WBG’s primary task is not to be held 
accountable for its projects, or to help poor people, but to make money as a business.  Others 
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have attacked the WBG for contributing to the erosion of local cultures around the world 
(Martello and Jasanoff 2004). 
As an advisory body with limited focus on compliance with WB policies and loan 
documents and limited time period before full disbursement, the IP cannot address these 
fundamental concerns.  As Carrascott and Guernsey (2008) criticized: 
As an interior body of the Bank itself, [the IP’s] ideas cannot be completely independent 
of the ideology of that institution.  Because the Panel is an arm of the Bank, it is by 
definition an institution with a de facto World Bank bias and consequently acts with the 
interests of the institution in mind and not necessarily with the interests of the affected 
communities. 
 
Similarly, Navin Rai, a former World Bank official in charge of protection for indigenous people 
from 2000 to 2012, commented that for much of the duration of the IP: 
There was often no intent on the part of the governments to comply, and there was often 
no intent on the part of the bank’s management to enforce.  That was how the game was 
played. (Quoted in Chavkin and Anderson 2015) 
Put another way, even if the IP makes the WBG more accountable, it does not significantly 
reform the Bank’s need to finance loans so that it can operate a budget and return investments to 
its Member Countries. 
6. Conclusion: Lessons and Implications   
At least three conclusions emerge from this assessment of the WBG’s Inspection Panel 
related to transparency and institutional accountability, environmental governance, and energy 
policy.     
First, institutional accountability has demonstrated some inherent value in improving the 
internal governance of an institution—in this case the World Bank—and its ability to achieve 
development and sustainability goals (Nelson 2011).  The IP has seen some WBG managers self-
monitor their own behavior; it has seen peers, other donors, and governments monitor WBG 
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actions to ensure it is meeting its standards; it has seen communities and civil society groups 
monitor WBG actions on the ground.  Although the evidence is more anecdotal than systematic, 
the IP has reduced errors and at times corruption within Bank management, and made it harder to 
conduct shoddy analysis or rush projects to meet deadlines and lending targets.  Transparency 
from the IP has facilitated the involvement of displaced and indigenous communities in WBG 
policymaking through formal Action Plans.   
In this way, the IP affirms the weight of accountability as a worthwhile public good or 
salient public concern for extractive industry infrastructure and energy projects.  The fairness and 
transparency of WBG decisions, the adequacy of legal protections, and the legitimacy and 
inclusivity of agents involved in decision-making can matter as much as the substantive nature of 
WBG projects.  Institutional accountability intersects with recognition (who is recognized), 
participation (who gets to participate), and power (how is power distributed in decision-making 
forums). Fair procedures matter because even when flawed, they can at times promote better—
more equitable but also more efficient and effective—outcomes. 
Second, although the environmental governance engendered by the IP (and perhaps other 
IAMs) has elements of devolved control and participatory modes of inclusion, it needs strongly 
coordinated. In other words, to be effective environmental governance mechanisms need steered 
by committed and independent leaders on all sides.  The “watchers” need “watched,” the 
“guardians” need “guarded,” the “moneylenders” need “monitored,” so to speak. In the case of 
the IP, numerous presidents of the Bank and members of the Board had to persevere with the 
mere idea of creating an IP.  Members of the IP had to demonstrate the fortitude to stand up to 
the Board and senior management when they resisted such accountability.  Communities and 
their leaders exhibited the strength and dedication to file complaints, even in the face of potential 
and actual retaliation and, at times, violence.  Such communities benefitted from remarkably 
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brave social activists (Hunter 2003).  Put another way, accountability and institutional 
transparency can be transformative processes but only if matched with institutions and 
champions devoted to it succeeding.  Institutional accountability may be insufficient as an ideal 
to lead to lasting positive improvements in performance without this level of personal 
commitment from individuals. 
Third, for those interested in energy and extractive industries policy more generally, there 
are limits to what IPs can accomplish.  Even with the perseverance and commitment from 
dedicated stakeholders within and associated with the WBG, the IP has only investigated about 
one-third of its requests. It had to struggle against both the inertia of WBG operating practices 
and, for almost six years after it was created and perhaps most recently post-2014, hostile 
managers and changing priorities.  Severe retaliation and backlash against communities and 
individuals filing complaints has occurred, with some facing imprisonment and others 
confronting death or the complete destruction of their homes or ways of life.  The IP has a 
limited mandate and lacks more authoritative, legally binding power to enforce its decisions.  
The IP, for instance, does not have the final say for complaints, the Executive Board does; it 
cannot offer compensation for redress; nor can it cancel projects by itself.  It also involves 
transaction costs that are coming to make the act of filing a complaint, and engaging with the IP, 
a technical process dominated by experts rather than a more open forum easily accessible to 
indigenous people, the extreme poor, or the illiterate.  These factors suggest that an IP that may 
have stronger normative rather than empirical value.  
Moreover, the IP signifies that “effective” instructional accountability is itself a 
subjective and a contested concept.  The IP must remain effective at ensuring its own existence, 
promoting its agenda of holding the WB accountable, protecting communities and, now, 
assisting the WB in its mission of competiveness and profit maximization.  The process of 
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financing multilateral infrastructure is not only about competing priorities but competing 
interpretations of effectiveness and competing systems of accountability – to communities to 
shareholders, to Executive Board, to society as a whole.  Effectiveness becomes about managing 
such competing interests and expectations as much as it is about building infrastructure or 
lending resources for projects.   
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